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The Belief in Science Scale (BISS) is a unidimensional measure that assesses the
degree to which science is valued as a source of superior knowledge. Due to increased
academic interest in the concept of belief in science, the BISS has emerged as an
important measurement instrument. Noting an absence of validation evidence, the
present paper, via two studies, evaluated the scale’s factorial structure. Both studies
drew on data collected from previous research. Study 1 (N = 686), using parallel
analysis and exploratory factor analysis, identified a unidimensional solution accounting
for 56.43% of the observed variance. Study 2 (N = 535), using an independent sample,
tested the unidimensional solution using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Data-model
fit was good (marginal for RMSEA): CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.09 (90% CI
of 0.08 to 0.10), SRMR = 0.04. Invariance testing across gender supported invariance
of form, factor structure, and item intercepts for this one-factor model. BISS at the
overall level correlated negatively with the reality testing dimension of the Inventory of
Personality Organization (IPO-RT), demonstrating convergent validity. Researchers often
use the IPO-RT as an indirect index of preference for experiential processing (intuitive
thinking). In this context, only BISS scores above the median (second quartile) produced
a reduction in experiential-based thinking. The authors discuss these findings in the
context of belief in science as a psychometric construct.
Keywords: belief in science, psychometric validation, reality testing, thinking style, convergent validity
INTRODUCTION
Beliefs are a fundamental aspect of human cognition that fulfill important individual and social
functions. Explicitly, beliefs provide meaning, comfort, and communality (Hogg and Mulling, 1999;
Heine et al., 2006). This is particularly true of religious faith, which is associated with a range
of positive psychological benefits. These include moderating negative factors related to lack of
control (Kay et al., 2009), reducing anxiety (Inzlicht et al., 2011) and decreasing stress (Ano and
Vasconcelles, 2005). Farias et al. (2013) contend that secular beliefs, such as Humanism and political
ideologies perform comparable functions within non-religious individuals (Gray, 2004).
Although science and religion offer competing, often contradictory explanations, at a deeper,
conceptual level, research suggests that they perform comparable psychological functions (i.e.,
structure life, provide reassurance, and facilitate social integration) (Ziman, 1978/1991). In
support of this notion, studies report that beliefs related to human advancement offer positive,
compensatory psychological functions (Rutjens et al., 2009, 2010). Explicitly, higher levels of belief
in science are associated with positive psychological outcomes, such as happiness, lower levels of
stress and reduced death anxiety (Aghababaei et al., 2016).
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Acknowledging the potentially important role that secular
beliefs play in modern society, Farias et al. (2013) developed
the Belief in Science Scale (BISS). The BISS is a 10-item
research tool, which measures the degree to which individuals
endorse the legitimacy of the scientific approach. Particularly,
the BISS assesses belief in the value of science as an institution
and a source of superior knowledge. Accordingly, the scale
recognizes differences in attitudes toward science. These range
from rejection of the scientific approach, through acceptance
of science as a reliable but fallible source of knowledge, to the
conviction that science provides exclusive, veridical insights into
reality. The latter doctrinaire perspective depicts science as a
unique, central value. Consistent with this, the defining features
of belief in science are confidence and trust in the validity of
scientific methods and outcomes. Furthermore, higher belief in
science is associated with outright dismissal of notions that sit
outside of the traditional scientific framework. This manifests
typically as rejection of scientifically unsubstantiated beliefs (i.e.,
paranormal) and religious skepticism.
Farias et al. (2013) tested the notion that belief in science
provides secular individuals with psychological meaning and
comfort in threatening contexts by conducting two related
studies. These necessitated the development of BISS. Prior to the
first experiment, Farias et al. (2013) gave items assessing belief in
science to a sample of 144 participants. Subsequent psychometric
examination, in the form of exploratory factor analysis (varimax
rotation), yielded a single dimension accounting for 57% of the
variance. All items loaded (≥0.56) and the scale demonstrated
high internal consistency (α = 0.86). The overall sample mean
(M = 3.23, SD = 1.04) was consistent with moderate belief
in science. In study two (N = 60), further consideration of
the psychometric properties of BISS, also found good internal
consistency (α = 0.88).
Following the initial evaluation, Farias et al. (2013) used
the BISS in their experiments. The first, found that rowers
in a high-stress condition (pre-completion) vs. low-stress
condition (training) reported greater belief in science. This
result was congruent with the notion that belief in science
helps secular individuals cope with stress. Although, Farias et al.
(2013) acknowledged that context manipulation (competition
vs. training) might affect also scientific focus (i.e., encourage
emphasis on training regimen and equipment).
Within the second experiment, participants were assigned
randomly to one of two mortality salience conditions (thoughts
and feeling about own death vs. experiencing dental pain;
control) and completed self-report measures assessing scientific
determinism (Paulhus and Carey, 2010), religiosity and affect
(negative and positive) (Watson et al., 1988).
Noting potential construct overlap, a moderate positive
correlation between belief in science and scientific determinism
(Paulhus and Carey, 2010), Farias et al. (2013) conducted a
principal components analysis (PCA) on all science-related items.
This used oblimin rotation, an oblique solution that permits
factor correlation. The PCA identified three related but distinct
factors: belief in science, original 10-items (eigenvalue = 5.74,
loadings ≥0.62); scientific determinism (environmental factors),
3-items (eigenvalue = 2.02, loadings ≥0.68); and scientific
determinism (biological factors), 4-items (eigenvalue = 1.79,
loadings ≥0.66). This outcome supported the supposition that
belief in science, although correlated with scientific determinism,
was a separate construct. Consistent with study one outcomes,
analysis revealed that participants in the mortality salience
condition (vs. controls) scored higher on belief in science.
Overall, findings were consistent with Farias et al.’s (2013)
conceptualisation of science as a form of “faith” in secular
individuals that facilitates coping in stressful and anxiety-
provoking situations. Furthermore, Farias et al. (2013) concluded
that analytical thinking, rational enquiry and consideration
of empirical evidence were key characteristics associated
with scientific thinking. In this context, belief in science
places an emphasis on fact based, objective (vs. objective
experiential) evidence.
The BISS has also demonstrated criterion validity across a
range of studies. For instance, Irwin et al. (2016) reported a
negative moderate correlation (r = −0.55) between belief in
science and the New Age Beliefs subscale of the Survey of
Scientifically Unsubstantiated Beliefs (SUBS) (Irwin and Marks,
2013). This was consistent with Irwin et al. (2015), who
observed strong negative associations between BISS and SUBS
subscales (New Age Beliefs, r = −0.63; Traditional Religious
Beliefs, r = −0.71). Moreover, Irwin et al. (2015) reported a
moderate negative relationship (r =−0.32) between BISS and The
Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO–RT; Lenzenweger
et al., 2001). The IPO–RT assesses self-reported proneness to
deficits in reality testing and researchers often use the scale as an
index of experiential, intuitive thinking style (Drinkwater et al.,
2012; Dagnall et al., 2015a, 2018; Denovan et al., 2017b).
Consistent with this notion, Irwin et al. (2016) found that
believers in the paranormal tended to discount the values of
science, and preferred to endorse ideas based on their emotional
(rather than their rational) appeal. Accordingly, believers subject
decisions to less critical scrutiny. Irwin et al. (2016) concluded
that these characteristics reflect opposing worldviews. The
scientific perspective comprises presumptive skepticism and
an acceptance of the values of science, whereas a subjective
and anti-materialistic outlook on life typifies paranormal belief
(Zusne and Jones, 1989). Generally, these findings concur with
preceding work that indicates that faith in science, religion
and the paranormal represent independent dimensions of belief
(Williams et al., 1989; Ståhl et al., 2016).
Despite these encouraging outcomes, the BISS is
psychometrically underdeveloped. Even though widely cited,
researchers have yet to validate the BISS. Indeed, consideration
of the literature reveals that other than the reported EFA,
the BISS structure remains unsubstantiated. Furthermore,
within studies employing the BISS, authors have either failed to
include psychometric details (Valdesolo et al., 2016), or merely
confirmed that the BISS possesses high internal consistency (i.e.,
Irwin et al., 2015, α = 0.93; Ståhl et al., 2016, α = 0.96). This lacks
exactitude and rigor because scale analysis has failed to progress
beyond EFA. Hence, further research is required to evaluate the
measurement properties of the BISS.
Additionally, EFA is problematic when used in isolation
because it merely identifies underlying factor structure within
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observed variables without reference to outcome (i.e., construct
coherence). Typically, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is
generally required to test the appropriateness of the emergent
model (Suhr, 2006). This is consistent with psychometric
theorists, who contend that scale development should start with
exploration (EFA) then progress to CFA. CFA is preferable when
measurement models possess a well-developed underlying theory
for hypothesized patterns of loadings (Hurley et al., 1997). In the
case of BISS, Farias et al. (2013) advocate a single, general factor
underpinning belief in science. Hence, a thorough examination
of scale structure is required in order to establish the conceptual
constraints of the scale and determine its usefulness as a general
measure of belief in science.
The present study examined the psychometric properties of
the BISS by performing two related studies. Study 1 evaluated
the analysis performed by Farias et al. (2013) via utilizing
Horn’s parallel analysis in addition to EFA. This was necessary
to examine the replicability of Farias et al.’s (2013) results in
an EFA context. Study 2 comprised a test of the resultant
factor model from study 1 using CFA. Invariance testing
followed an analysis of general factor structure, by assessing
the degree to which different groups (males and females)
performed on the measure. Invariance testing provides a further
level of psychometric scrutiny by evaluating the extent to
which scores reflect true differences across groups as opposed
to artifacts of measurement bias (Brown, 2006; Byrne, 2010;
Denovan et al., 2017a). Study 2 extended the preceding study
by testing the emergent factor structure within an independent
sample, and by assessing the convergent validity of BISS.
Convergent validity is useful to assess whether a measure of
a specific construct aligns with another measure it should
theoretically relate to. The IPO-RT was an appropriate measure
because it is a known correlate of belief in science, which
indexes intuitive thinking. Specifically, the IPO-RT assesses
proneness to reality testing deficits (Dagnall et al., 2014,
2015b, 2018). Explicitly, “the capacity to differentiate self from
non-self, intrapsychic from external stimuli, and to maintain
empathy with ordinary social criteria of reality” (Kernberg,
1996, p. 120). This delineation is consistent with Langdon
and Coltheart’s (2000) information-processing style account of
belief generation. Noting these conceptual features, researchers
frequently use the IPO-RT as an index of experiential, intuitive
thinking style (Drinkwater et al., 2012; Dagnall et al., 2015b;
Denovan et al., 2017a).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data Collection and Procedure
In order to evaluate the psychometric properties of the BISS
two independent samples of respondents were required. To
create these, amalgamation of data sets from previously published
studies and ongoing research projects was undertaken. The
researchers collected all data via online survey. In total, this
comprised five merged data sets. Researchers have previously
successfully utilized this method to generate large heterogeneous
samples. Prominent examples are Revised Paranormal Belief
Scale (Drinkwater et al., 2017), and Australian Sheep Goat Scale
(Drinkwater et al., 2018).
Integration of BISS data sets was apposite since the research
team have previously used the measure in comparable self-
report studies. These have addressed a range of diverse
research questions. The main advantage of data merging is the
generation of sample sizes that permit the use of sophisticated
statistical techniques. Explicitly, the combining data increases
sample size, enhances statistical power and produces greater
within sample variation (Van der Steen et al., 2008). This is
particularly important when using procedures such as CFA,
which require as many cases as possible (Brown, 2006). Hence,
consolidation of BISS data was a convenient method that utilized
existing, previously screened data to meet analytical constraints.
Moreover, this approach generates a sample that would be
difficult to recruit because of cost and time limitations.
Data collection for both studies occurred between September
2012 and September 2016 (see section “Ethics”). Recruitment
was by emails to students (undergraduate and postgraduate)
enrolled on healthcare programs (Nursing, Physiotherapy,
Psychology, Speech, and Language Therapy, etc.), staff across
faculties at the Manchester Metropolitan University, and local
businesses/community groups. There were two exclusion criteria.
Firstly, respondents had to be at least 18 years of age. Secondly,
in order to prevent multiple responses instructions stated that
respondents must not participate if they had undertaken similar
or related research.
In all cases, respondents within the original research
completed the BISS alongside several other measures. These
assessed cognitive-perceptual personality factors, decision-
making and anomalous beliefs (i.e., Irwin et al., 2015, 2016). In
study 1, the BISS did not appear alongside the IPO-RT, whereas
study 2 data derived from instances where the BISS and IPO-RT
appeared within the same set of measures.
All studies employed the same, routine standardized
procedures. Before undertaking the measures potential
respondents received detailed information from the researchers.
This outlined study aims, purpose, content, and ethical
procedures. Assenting respondents provided informed consent
via a survey option confirming willingness to participate.
Subsequently, respondents received the study materials.
Together with study measures there was a brief demographic
section requesting age, preferred gender, and course of study if
student, or occupation. Procedural instructions were consistent
across studies. They directed respondents to progress through
sections systematically, respond to items in an open and honest
manner, work at their own pace, and reassured respondents that
there were no right or wrong answers. To prevent potential order
effects section order rotated across respondents.
Ethics Statement
The research team gained ethical authorization for a program
of studies exploring relationships between anomalous beliefs,
decision-making and cognitive-perceptual personality factors as
part of the grant bidding process. In total, there were three bi-
annual calls (September 2012, 2014, and 2016). Review rated each
application as routine and granted ethical approval. The Director
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of the Research Institute for Health and Social Change (Faculty
of Health, Psychology and Social Care) and Ethics Committee
within the Manchester Metropolitan University supervised
this process. This process demanded that two experienced
reviewers scrutinized the documentation. If research, as in
this case, is classified as routine this constitutes full ethical
approval. This was the required level of institutional approval at
that point in time.
Respondents
Study 1
The data set for study 1 contained 686 respondents. The mean
(M) sample age was 26.70 years (SD = 11.07, range = 18–
69 years). Disaggregation by gender revealed that 279 (40%)
respondents were male and 407 (60%) female. Skewness and
kurtosis values were within the recommended range of −2.0
to +2.0 (Byrne, 2010; Table 1). However, examination of
multivariate normality suggested non-normality, as Mardia’s
(1970) skewness (b1p = 9.80, p < 0.001) and kurtosis estimates
(b2p = 29.737, p < 0.001) indicated significant deviation from a
normal distribution.
Study 2
The Study 2 sample comprised 534 (262, 49% male; 272, 51%
female) respondents who had completed both the BISS and the
IPO-RT. Mean (M) sample age was 37 (SD = 14.74, range = 18–
71 years). All items, with the exception of IPO-RT items 4 and 16,
demonstrated acceptable univariate skewness and kurtosis (i.e.,
between −2.0 and +2.0) (Table 1). Although, multivariate non-
normality existed (skewness: b1p = 130.27, p < 0.001; kurtosis:
b2p = 52.28, p < 0.001).
Measures
Study 1
The only measure examined in Study 1 was the BISS. The BISS
is a 10-item, self-report tool that assesses level of epistemic
beliefs related to science. Specifically, items reference notions
of scientific pre-eminence (i.e., the idea that science possesses
unique and central value that provide a superior, exclusive guide
to reality) (Farias et al., 2013; Valdesolo et al., 2016). Items take
the form of statements (e.g., “We can only rationally believe
in what is scientifically provable”), and respondents indicate
level of agreement via a 6-point Likert scale (ranging from 1
“strongly disagree” to 6 “strongly agree”). Thus, raw scores range
from 10 to 60, with higher scores indicating stronger belief in
science. Previous work reports that the BISS is unidimensional
and possesses high internal consistency (Farias et al., 2013;
Irwin et al., 2015).
Study 2
In study 2, alongside the BISS, respondents completed the
IPO-RT subscale of The Inventory of Personality Organization
(IPO–RT; Lenzenweger et al., 2001). Within the IPO-RT,
there are 20-items presented as statements (e.g., “When
everything around me is unsettled and confused, I feel
that way inside”). Respondents indicate the degree to which
they endorse each statement using a five-point Likert scale
TABLE 1 | Summary statistics for all Study 1 and Study 2 variables.
Study 1 Study 2
BISS item M SD Skew. Kurt. M SD Skew. Kurt. IPO-RT item M SD Skew. Kurt.
Q1 4.90 1.41 −1.38 1.09 5.21 1.27 −1.67 1.98 Q1 2.98 0.88 −0.19 0.04
Q2 4.05 1.46 −0.55 −0.48 4.73 1.44 −1.04 0.19 Q2 2.19 1.01 0.35 −0.79
Q3 3.97 1.53 −0.49 −0.82 4.27 1.67 −0.66 −0.85 Q3 2.47 0.97 0.22 −0.53
Q4 3.36 1.60 −0.03 −1.23 3.52 1.74 −0.17 −1.35 Q4 1.41 0.70 1.90 3.91
Q5 3.31 1.53 0.01 −1.09 3.65 1.69 −0.14 −1.25 Q5 2.43 0.97 0.15 −0.44
Q6 3.54 1.59 −0.15 −1.14 4.01 1.79 −0.47 −1.14 Q6 2.22 1.05 0.59 −0.32
Q7 3.19 1.60 0.17 −1.14 3.52 1.78 −0.08 −1.37 Q7 1.66 0.92 1.29 1.00
Q8 3.49 1.56 −0.12 −1.05 3.84 1.63 −0.37 −1.02 Q8 1.51 0.84 1.59 1.80
Q9 4.09 1.49 −0.65 −0.44 4.46 1.59 −0.89 −0.29 Q9 2.05 1.10 0.66 −0.64
Q10 4.57 1.32 −0.84 0.26 5.02 1.23 −1.18 0.73 Q10 2.14 0.96 0.48 −0.38
Q11 1.71 0.85 1.07 0.68
Q12 1.63 0.89 1.20 0.49
Q13 1.93 0.91 0.85 0.46
Q14 2.02 1.02 0.77 −0.18
Q15 2.02 1.16 0.90 −0.18
Q16 1.54 0.97 1.89 2.94
Q17 2.26 1.07 0.29 −0.88
Q18 1.71 0.88 1.12 0.63
Q19 1.61 0.87 1.25 0.67
Q20 2.13 1.01 0.68 −0.02
BISS, Belief in Science Scale, IPO-RT, Inventory of Personality Organization-Reality Testing subscale.
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(1 = never true to 5 = always true). Accordingly, total
scores range from 20 to 100, with higher scores reflecting
subjective evaluation of perceived likelihood of reality testing
errors. Researchers often use IPO-RT scores as an index of
intuitive thinking style (Denovan et al., 2017b). This derives
from the supposition that the IPO-RT references suspension
of reality testing, external critical evaluation (Irwin, 2004).
Studies have established the psychometric properties of the
IPO-RT. Particularly the measure possesses construct validity
and demonstrates excellent internal consistency (α = 0.90;
ω = 0.93) and test–retest reliability (Lenzenweger et al., 2001;
Dagnall et al., 2018).
Data Analysis
Psychometric examination of the BISS progressed through a
series of increasingly sophisticated analytical techniques. These
included Horn’s parallel analysis, exploratory factor analysis
[EFA via maximum likelihood (MLR)], and CFA. The initial
use of parallel analysis alongside scree plot assessment was
necessary to judge the number of underlying factors. In addition,
parallel analysis represents the most accurate approach to
determine the quantity of factors to keep (Pallant, 2007).
Accordingly, this included random resampling of the raw
data (O’connor, 2000). EFA (SPSS 25) using the suggested
number of factors then provided information on item loadings
(Çokluk and Koçak, 2016).
Following parallel analysis and EFA, CFA conducted via Mplus
7.4 (Muthén and Muthén, 2015) assessed the appropriateness
of data-model fit. Testing used the robust MLR method. This
produces MLR parameter estimates and standard errors that are
robust to instances of non-normality (Marsh et al., 2013).
The chi-square statistic (χ2), Comparative Fit Index (CFI),
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and absolute fit indices (Root-Mean-
Square Error of Approximation, RMSEA; Standardized Root-
Mean-Square Residual, SRMR) gaged model fit. The 90%
confidence interval (CI) was included for RMSEA. CFI and TLI
values>0.90 indicates good fit (Hopwood and Donnellan, 2010).
According to Browne and Cudeck (1993), absolute values of 0.05,
0.06–0.08, and 0.08–1.0 reflect good, satisfactory, and marginal fit
for RMSEA and SRMR.
Omega coefficient (estimated using JASP; Jeffreys’s Amazing
Statistics Program) determined internal consistency before
invariance testing. This is a more effective reliability
estimate than popular approaches such as coefficient
alpha, which typically over- or underestimates the true
reliability of a measure (Deng and Chan, 2017). Multi-
group CFA examined invariance of factor structure
(configural), factor loadings (metric), and item intercepts
(scalar) in relation to gender for the superior factor
solution. Chen’s (2007) criteria of a CFI difference ≤ 0.01
and RMSEA ≤ 0.015 determined satisfactory fit for each
invariance test.
In order to determine the replicability of the factor model from
Study 1 in an independent sample, Study 2 analysis examined
this model using CFA and measurement invariance. Also within
Study 2, a test of convergent validity occurred. This involved
comparing BISS with the criterion measure IPO-RT.
RESULTS
Study 1
For parallel analysis, eigenvalues from the raw data with
values higher than those from the random data represent the
resultant factors. A parallel analysis (with 1000 resamples)
revealed that one factor (eigenvalue = 5.64) possessed an
eigenvalue higher than random data (eigenvalue = 1.19).
Therefore, one factor existed. Scree plot assessment further
confirmed this. EFA examined the BISS with the restricted
number of factors (Çokluk and Koçak, 2016). Results revealed
satisfactory sampling adequacy; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure
(KMO) = 0.92 and a reasonable item correlation matrix,
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p < 0.001). The single factor
explained 56.43% of variance, and all factor loadings bar one
(item 2) exceeded 0.4 (Norman and Streiner, 1994) with the
majority of items (8 of 10) exceeding the strict factor loading
requirements of 0.6 by Hair et al. (1998). Although item 2
loaded below 0.4, it exceeded the minimum cut-off of 0.32
suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2014). Lastly, examination
of internal consistency revealed omega reliability was high
for BISS, ω = 0.91.
Study 2
A replication of the resultant one-factor model in study 1
with a separate dataset revealed (using CFA) good fit and
marginal fit for RMSEA, χ2 (35, N = 534) = 202.26, p < 0.001,
CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.09 (90% CI of 0.08 to 0.10),
SRMR = 0.04. Inspection of standardized parameter estimates
(Table 2) reported a similar distribution of item loadings to study
1. Omega reliability was consistent with Study 1 (i.e., high for
BISS, ω = 0.93). In addition, for IPO-RT omega reliability was
good, ω = 0.88.
Multi-group analysis comparing gender revealed good model
fit at the configural level across indices (excluding RMSEA), χ2
(70, N = 534) = 239.73, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.91,
RMSEA = 0.09 (90% CI of 0.08 to 0.10), SRMR = 0.04.
For metric invariance, an acceptable CFI difference of 0.005
existed alongside a minimal RMSEA difference of 0.002. Scalar
invariance testing indicated a satisfactory difference for CFI
(0.009) and RMSEA (0.001).
A test of convergent validity examined Pearson correlations
between total BISS with Reality Testing (IPO-RT). Total
BISS possessed a significant negative correlation with IPO-
RT, r(532) = −0.28, p < 0.001 (95% CI of −0.36 to
−0.19). Post hoc analyses split BISS at the quartile level
to assess further its relationship with IPO-RT. A one-way
ANOVA (using bootstrapping with 1000 resamples) indicated
a differential relationship existed between BISS quartiles and
IPO-RT, F(3,530) = 17.62, p < 0.001. Given the identification
of non-normality in the data, bootstrapping enables a more
accurate estimation of p-values and standard errors (Byrne,
2010). Indeed, bootstrapping performs well even in datasets
of extreme non-normality (Nevitt and Hancock, 2001), and
is a suitable alternative to MLR estimation considering an
ANOVA command is not present in Mplus. The bootstrapping
procedure generated estimations of standard errors alongside
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TABLE 2 | Standardized parameter estimates for CFA in Study 2.
Item Parameter estimate R2
Q1 Science provides us with a better understanding of the universe than does religion. 0.59∗∗ 0.35
Q2 “In a demon-haunted world, science is a candle in the dark.” (Carl Sagan) 0.47∗∗ 0.22
Q3 We can only rationally believe in what is scientifically provable. 0.80∗∗ 0.65
Q4 Science tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of. 0.79∗∗ 0.62
Q5 All the tasks human beings face are soluble by science. 0.82∗∗ 0.67
Q6 The scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge. 0.90∗∗ 0.81
Q7 The only real kind of knowledge we can have is scientific knowledge. 0.88∗∗ 0.78
Q8 Science is the most valuable part of human culture. 0.76∗∗ 0.58
Q9 Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth. 0.81∗∗ 0.66
Q10 Scientists and science should be given more respect in modern society. 0.68∗∗ 0.46
∗∗ Indicate p < 0.001; all R2-values statistically significant at p < 0.001.
bias-corrected and accelerated CIs (at the 95% confidence level).
Further scrutiny via mean comparisons tested the possibility
that the relationship between BIS and IPO-RT was not linear.
Using Bonferroni correction revealed, that whilst no differences
were present between the first and second quartile, scores
above the median differed significantly from those below
the median. This indicates that a moderate level of BISS
is required before a decline in intuitive thinking becomes
evident (Table 3).
DISCUSSION
The present paper found that, consistent with Farias et al.
(2013), a one-factor solution best explained BISS scores.
Further psychometric consideration revealed that the measure
demonstrated good/excellent internal consistency across the two
studies (study 1,ω = 0.91, study 2,ω = 0.93). Examination of scale
items indicated that respondents esteemed both the principles of
science (i.e., providing meaning) and the application of science to
specific applications (i.e., problem solving).
Studies 1 and 2 validated the one-factor solution, signifying
that this was congruent with the single factor model advocated
by Farias et al. (2013). Support for the one-factor solution
was compelling because study 2 using an independent sample
replicated the model tested in study 1. In terms of convergent
validity, the BISS negatively correlated with reality testing
(r = −0.28). The size of this relationship was similar to
the correlation observed by Irwin et al. (2015) (r = −0.32).
Overall, findings suggest that belief in science is moderately
associated with the tendency to engage in experiential, intuitive
thought. Within the present study, the BISS correlated negatively
with the IPO-RT.
Collectively study findings indicated that higher levels of belief
in science were associated with a lower propensity to reality
testing deficits. A caveat to this statement was the observation
that a decline in RT scores was evident only within participants
scoring above the median on BISS, r = −0.12, n = 269, p = 0.03
(95% CI of −0.02 to −0.24). Below the median, there was no
relationship between BISS and IPO-RT, r = −0.01, n = 265,
p = 0.449 (95% CI of −0.14 to 0.13). This implies that moderate
levels of BISS were required to facilitate a reduction in subjective,
experiential-based thinking.
This view is consistent with the conceptual nature of scientific
thinking. Explicitly, that analytical thinking is a key tenet of the
scientific approach. This includes critical evaluation in the form
of rational enquiry and objective consideration of evidence. These
features are inherently contrary to intuitive thinking, which
draws upon experiential, subjective appraisal of information.
In this context, the findings are congruent with Farias et al.’s
(2013) notion that higher levels of belief in science reflect a
preference for analytical thinking. This typically manifests as
a predilection for objective, external fact based (vs. subjective
experiential) evidence.
Although these conclusions are congruent with previous
research, there are limitations to consider. A particular
concern is the size of the correlation between BISS and RT,
which was only in the medium range. Indeed, the variables
shared only approximately 7% variance. This is indicative
of the fact that a range of factors in addition to belief
in science influence thinking style. These include, but are
not restricted to, motivation or ability to expend cognitive
effort (Shiloh et al., 2002), and ability, in the form of
task-relevant background knowledge or expertise (Novak and
Hoffman, 2008). Accordingly, future studies should examine
the degree to which these factors interact with belief in
TABLE 3 | Reality testing scores as a function of belief in science quartiles.
Comparisons (mean differences) between
quartiles
Contrast Mean difference (Sig.) 95% BCa CI
Quartile 1 vs. Quartile 2 0.74(0.537) −1.58, 3.06
Quartile 1 vs. Quartile 3 4.99( < 0.001)∗∗ 2.49, 7.69
Quartile 1 vs. Quartile 4 7.75( < 0.001)∗∗ 5.39, 10.18
Quartile 2 vs. Quartile 3 4.25(0.004)∗ 1.71, 6.85
Quartile 2 vs. Quartile 4 7.01( < 0.001)∗∗ 4.60, 9.35
Quartile 3 vs. Quartile 4 2.76(0.026)∗ 0.48, 5.09
∗ Indicates p < 0.05, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.001; 95% BCa CI: Bias-corrected and
Accelerated confidence interval based on 1000 bootstrapped samples.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 April 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 861
fpsyg-10-00861 April 14, 2019 Time: 11:9 # 7
Dagnall et al. Belief in Science Scale
science. It seems likely that high (vs. low cognitive) load
and level of proficiency will influence the degree to which
individuals appraise information, make decisions and draw
on faith in science. With hindsight, the observation of a
small correlation concurs with the view that the IPO-RT
assesses a peculiar definition of thinking style. Specifically, one
that indexes reality distortions and psychotic like phenomena
(Lenzenweger et al., 2001).
A further concern is that both the BISS and IPO-RT
are only “proxy” indirect measures of preferential thinking
style. Accordingly, the scales do not directly assess thought.
Instead, they index qualities reflective of the respective
thinking style (Denovan et al., 2017b). In this context,
it is important to note that BISS assesses “belief in the
veracity of the scientific principles and methods,” and IPO-
RT taps the inclination to draw upon internal (rather than
external) cognitions. Moreover, the present study failed to
consider demographic factors such as level of education and
occupational statues, which may indirectly influence critical
thinking and belief in science. Thus, subsequent research
could consider also the degree to which these factors affect
belief in science.
Regarding BISS, there is an important distinction between
confidence in the concept of science and the application
of science based rationality. Many scientific informed
discussions, such as those around climate change and the
extinction of the dinosaurs, require systematic evaluation
of information collected via methodical means. However,
this process is often truncated, or terminated prematurely.
This is often the case when individuals hold strong views
about a topic and select (either consciously or unconsciously)
evidence that supports their perspective. This assimilation
bias leads to the dismissal of disconfirming evidence (Lord
et al., 1979; Whitmarsh, 2011). Hence, it is possible to
have a high belief in science, but base decision making
on experiential (intuitive) rather than rational (analytical)
appraisal of evidence.
In the case of the IPO-RT, reality testing is an abstract,
spontaneous cognitive-perceptual process. Subsequently,
individuals may lack either conscious awareness, or veridical
insight into the nature of reality testing (Denovan et al.,
2017b). This is especially true because metacognition
encompasses two principle mechanisms, knowledge of
and control of cognition (Larkin, 2009; Schneider and
Artelt, 2010). Measuring cognitive processes is difficult
for these reasons. This is true of metacognitive measures
generally. Consequently, the relationship between subjective
performance and actual performance is often weak (Rabbitt
and Abson, 1990; Reid and MacLullich, 2006; Buelow et al.,
2014). Hence, future studies should examine the extent to
which belief in science predicts performance on objective
critical thinking skills tests. This will reveal the degree to
which belief in the scientific approach corresponds to an
analytical thinking style.
It would also be worthwhile examining interactions between
other factors related to cognitive style, such as dogmatism,
and belief in science. Dogmatism is particularly pertinent
because it denotes close-mindedness (Rokeach, 1960; Shearman
and Levine, 2006). Specifically, the propensity to select and
process information in a manner that reinforces prior
opinions/expectations (Ottati et al., 2018). Accordingly,
inflexible adherence to belief is likely to affect appraisal
of evidence independent of thinking style. Open-minded
cognition in contrast is unbiased and involves selection
and processing of information in a manner unaffected by
prior opinions/expectations (Church and Samuelson, 2016;
Ottati et al., 2018). In the case of belief in science, this
could produce overreliance on the concept of science and a
dismissal of the limitations of the scientific approach. This
is certainly the case when science acts as a form of faith
that assists individuals to cope with stressful and anxiety-
provoking situations (Farias et al., 2013). This represents
an affective rather than a rational approach, which is the
antithesis of analytical, objective thought. Hence, scientific
extremism is a form of radical secular faith characterized by a
subjective worldview.
This paper indicates that the BISS is satisfactory at a
psychometric level. However, further research is necessary
because belief in science is a relatively new construct.
Explicitly, consideration of this alongside other belief related
measures would further understanding of the belief in science
construct. This is important because secular beliefs, such as
Humanism and belief in progress have demonstrated the
same compensatory mechanisms as belief in science (Rutjens
et al., 2010). Examining relationships between these factors
will provide a better understanding of their commonalities
and differences. For instance, belief in science provides
a framework for comprehending the world. Within this
science, people may regard science as intellectually and
socially progressive. However, science in the strictest sense is
neutral and amoral.
Indeed, as Sarewitz (2015) notes, the social, moral, and ethical
implications of deploying advances, such as new technology are
contentious rather than the science findings. Thus, scientific
advancements may not produce beneficial outcomes. In this
context, it may prove worthwhile to investigate whether increased
understanding of the scientific method reduces its positive
effects relative to Humanism and belief in progress. If no
differences are evident, then this suggests that any belief
system that provides explanations of the world will afford
comfort and assurance (see Preston and Epley, 2005). Thus,
it may be that positive beliefs by their nature have beneficial
psychological effects. These arise largely from subjective rather
than evidential means.
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